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1

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PROTECTING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Sandra Day

O'Conor*

It is a great honour to visit India and to have the opportunity to address
such a distinguished audience about the role of the judiciary in protecting
individual rights in the United States ..
Just this past May, the Indian Prime Minister had the occasion to speak
to the United State Congress. In his remarks, he spoke eloquently of the many
ways in which our two countries have influenced one another throughout our
histories. As an example of how your country influenced ours, he spoke of
how Henry David Thoreau's famous writings on civil disobedience were influenced by early India philosophy, and how, over a century later, Dr. Martin
Luther King's views on the same subject were influenced by Mahatma Gandhi.
So, to the significant extent that Dr. King's tireless efforts opened our nations
eyes and strengthened our moral fabric, we have India, in part, to thank.
Your Prime Minister also mentioned one area in which the United States
has influenced India: the area of constitutionally protected individual rights.
He explained:
In his final inaugural address (as the third President of the United
States), Thomas Jefferson spoke of "Freedom of religion, freedom
of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of Habeas
Corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected." When India gained
independence, we accepted these fundamental freedoms, and looked
to the Declaration of Independence and the Bill while formulating
the Constitution of the world's largest democracy. Now, both countries
are forever joined by the shared values of secularism, political
pluralism, and the rule of law.1
As an American citizen, I am honoured that India thought our Constitution's
protection of individual rights worth emulating, but I must admit that there is a
certain irony here. What Americans do not always remember is that the United
States Constitution as originally drafted in 1787 and did not contain a Bill of
Rights, let alone a judicially enforceable one.
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I
The American Constitution, drafted in 1787, was, like any political event,
the res'Ult of compromise.
Though the main advocates of the Constitution
called the Federalists - were very much concerned with the protection of individual rights, they thought the most effective way to accomplish
this was to
ensure that the democratic
government
they were establishing
would be a
limited one, that is, a government whose powers would be confined to those
specifically
enumerated in the Constitution.
So seriously did the founding generation take the idea of enumerated powers that the question of whether the
new government could charter a national bank provoked a fierce debate; many
thought that unless the Constitution expressly stated that Congress could charter a national bank, it could not do so. Although the main point of infringe on
the autonomy of the States - the United States has always had a robust federal
system - the Federalists also understood that a limited government would, by
definition, have little opportunity to infringe on individual rights.
The Federalists also thought that the very size of the new republic they
were forming would operate to protect individual rights; the argument, made
famous by the great Federalist James Madison, was that large geographic areas
contain so many different interest groups and factions that no single faction
could ever be durable enough and powerful enough to become a majority faction capable of tyrannizing
the minority and infringing individual rights.2 I
should note here that Madison's argument has withstood the test of time.
Despite an American press that often creates the opposite impression, it really
does n9t happen very often that the United States Congress passes laws that
impermissibly
infringe on constitutionally-protected
individual rights. Lastly,
the Federalists
thought that the checks and balance built into our Constitution
- for example, the power of the President to veto legislation - would enable the
three branches of government
to keep each other from overstepping
their
prerogatives
and possibly violating Constitutional
rights.
In short, the Federalists did not think a Bill of Rights was necessary.
What's more, some of them thought an express list of rights might actually
do
harm: by including some individual rights but not others, the Constitution
might be seen to be disappearing
those that were left out. And so it was that
the Constitution
that emerged from the famous Philadelphia
Convention
in
1787 did not contain a Bill of Rights.
The Federalists'
opponents - who were aptly called Anti- Federalists
vehemently disagreed with the decision not to have a Bill of Rights, and many
opposed ratification
of the Constitution
on just this ground. Eventually,
the
Federalists compromised on the matter: they promised that, soon after the Con-
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stitution became effective, amendments would be added protecting the basic
rights of individuals. These became the first ten amendments
to the Constitution, collectively
referred to as the Bill of Rights.
Many of the rights included in the Bill of Rights may already be familiar to you, as they appear in the Indian Constitution as well. The most notable
examples are the First Amendment freedoms to which your Prime Minister
alluded, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion. The Bill of Rights also protects citizens from
unreasonable
searches and seizures. It prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. It assures that private property will not
taken for public use without just compensation.
And it confers a panoply of
rights on the accused in criminal cases, including the assistance of counsel.
All these guarantees are written in language that any literate American can
understand, and many can recite from memory.
Two common features of these various rights stand out. One, they are
rights that people have against the government and government officials, not
against private actors. So, for example, it is not a violation of the Constitution's
freedom of religion guaranty for a private employer to have a policy of not
hiring, say, Catholics or Jews. Of course, congress often passes statutes that
extend these rights against private actors. I should add that there are exceptions: the 13th Amendment
provides that "(neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude
.. shall exist within the United States" - and this prohibition
is
indifferent to whether the enslavement by private or government actors. Two,
the rights in the Constitution are, by and large, "negative" rights, that is, they
mark out areas where the government may not intrude; they do not impose
affirmative obligations on government, So, for example, there are no COIlstitutional rights to the basic needs of life, such as a right to education or to a job
or to adequate health care. Again, if the people want to provide these needs
for one another, they may do it through legislation. I should add that there are
rare exception here as well: the right to counsel in crjminal cases does not just
meap that the government must not interfere in one's efforts to retain counsel;
it has been interpreted to mean that the government has an affirmative obligation to provide (with taxpayer money) lawyers for those who cannot afford
them. The idea that the United States Constitution affords primarily "negative"
rights finds resonance in the India Constitution.
The Indian ConstitutiQn COIltains a list of fundaments rights, which are basically negative rights and which
are judicially
enforceable,
and a set of "directive principles of state policy",
which are basically positive rights and which, as I understand it, where originally intended not to be judicially enforceable.
As important as the Bill of Rights may be, however, its belated inclusion
in the United States Constitution serves as an important reminder that the Constitution's
overriding purpose was not the provision of individual rights enforceable against
the majority; it was the establishment of democratic government - a democratic
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government of limited powers, to be sure, but one, nonetheless, where the will
of the majority would control. That the Constitution embodies, above all else, a
commitment to democracy and popular sovereignty is nowhere more manifest
that in the Constitution's preamble, which starts: "We the People of the United
States .... " This refrain may also sound similar to an India audience, given that
India's Constitution begins the exact same way: "We the people of India ... "
Actually, your preamble does betters ours by expressly stating that the goal of
the Constitution is to establish a "sovereign democratic republic". Our Constitution does not mention the "democracy", although the government it creates is
obviously a democracy.

II
After the adoption of the Bill of Rights, one might have expected very
real tensions to develop between the democratic, majoritarian impulses animating the main part of the Constitution and the decidedly anti-majoritarian
impulses animating the Bill of Rights. Yet such tensions would not develop and tbe guarantees of the Bill of Rights would not be fulfilled - without two
additional developments in American Constitutional history. The first was the
recognition of the power of judicial review, the "cornerstone" of our constitutionallaw. In 1803, in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison,3 the Supreme
Court declared that it had the authority to declare an Act of Congress void if,
in the opinion of the Justices, the Act violated the Constitution. The power of
judicial review is the foundation of the court's role in protection of individual
rights. Without it, the guarantees of the Bill of Rights would, as Alexander
Hamilton, another of the great Federalists, put it, "amount to nothing". With
the judicial review power, it is possible for an aggrieved individual to win a
victory in the Supreme Court that neither Congress nor the President can take
away. To say this is, is not to ignore the role of the executive and legislative
branches in upholding the constitutional rights of individuals; they too have
power to make decisions and take actions in accord with their best faith understanding of what the Constitution requires. Indeed, the other branches have the
duty to do so. As reflected in the oath that federal officials take upon entering
office.
Nonetheless, where there is a genuine dispute about what is,
protected by the Constitution, the power of judicial review means
ultimately up to the judiciary to resolve the dispute. As Chief Justice
sweepingly asserted in Marbury, "O)t is, emphatically, the province
of the judicial department, to say what the law is."

3

Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
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Here is another respect in which your Constitution may have done ours
one better: yours expressly provides for the power of judicial review. This is
not to say the Framers of the American Constitution would have been, or in
fact were, the least bit surprised by Marbury; included in the Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison in 1789, "The Bill of Rights is
necessary because the legal check which it puts into the hands of the Judiciary. "5 And around the same time, Alexander Hamilton, who disagreed with
Thomas Jefferson on so many things, agreed that "whenever a particular statute contravenes to adhere to the latter and disregard the former"; in this way,
he concluded, "the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a
limited Constitution again~t legislative encroachments"6 (Jefferson, I should
note, became much less enthusiastic for the institution of judicial review later
in life) .
. The second important development in the history of the judiciary's protection of constitutional rights came over 80- years later, with the passage of
the Reconstruction Amendments, particularly the 14th Amendment. As originally adopted, the Bill of Rights was directed only at abuses of power by the
federal government. The First Amendment, for example, says "Congress shall
make no laws ... abridging the freedom of speech ... "But what about the
States? In the aftermath of the American Civil War in the 1860s - and of the
emancipation of the slave during that war - the 14th Amendment was proposed
and ratified. It expressly addressed the States, and it says to them that they
may not "Deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person .... the equal protection of the laws". Many
states' regrettable experience with slavery reminded people, in the starkest terms
possible, that state governments can also trample on individual rights. Not too
surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court, in a subsequent series of landmark decisions, interpreted the 14th Amendment to incorporate most the provisions of
the Bills of Rights. This means that the fundamental liberties in the Bill of
Rights now apply not just against the federal government, but against the state
governments as well.
With that said, what many admirers of the application of federal constitutional protections to the states have rendered to forget is that the States have
their own Constitutions with their own Bill of Rights and their own courts to
enforce them. Indeed, in recent ye.ars, many reformers, having become dissatisfied with the reach of those protections under the United States Constitution,
have sought additional protection under the state constitutions. Regardless of
what one thinks about the legal merits of such efforts, the fact that these efforts
are taking place is a salutary reminder. that the United States is, after all, a
genuine federalist system.
5
6

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 1789) (excerpted in The Oxford
Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 71 (1992).
The Federalist Papers No. 78.
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The nation's experience with slavery also persuaded people of the special role that courts could, and should, play in protecting the rights of historically oppressed minorities. The text of the Equal Protection Clause - that no
government
official shall "deny to any person ... the equal protection of the
laws" - embodies that idea. So, for example, in the 1880s Strauder decision,?
the Supreme Court faced a state law that excluded blacks from serving on
juries, and it struck down that law. Who could argue, the Court asked rhetorically, that the Equal Protection Clause did not compel such a result? Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone aptly summarized the role of the courts in this area when
he wrote, in what is perhaps the most famous footnote in any Court opinion,
that laws directed at "discrete and insular minorities" may, because of "prejudice", deserve "special" judicial attention.s
Of course, in saying that the Constitution
gives courts the primary role
in the protection of individual rights, I do not mean to suggest that the courts especially
the Supreme Court on which I sit - have always lived up to their
assigned role. We have not. And, history has not looked fondly on our failures.
Many would say the Supreme Court's 1857 Dred Scott decision was the
worst decision in the Court's history.9 In that case, the Court upheld the right
of some people to hold others in bondage, to enslave them, a practice still in
effect in much of the United States at that time. The Court first held that blacks
were not citizens and could not sue in federal court. It also held that Congress
did not have the power to abolish slavery in the western territories
of the
United States. In the process, the Court noted that blacks has long "been regarded.as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." That unfortunate
decision was one of several factors leading to our tragic Civil War.
The Court fared no better when it decided the infamous case of Plessy v.
Fe rguson in 1896.10 In that case, Homer Adolph Plessy challenged a Louissiana
statute mandating separate train carriages for black and white passengers. Plessy
claimed that the state-imposed
separation constituted discrimination
in violation of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
The Supreme Court flatly rejected
Plessy's assertion,
saying, "We consider the underlying fallacy of (Plessy's)
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the coloured race with a badge of inferiority.
If this be so, it is
not by reason of anything found in the (law), but solely because the coloured
race chooses to put that construction
upon it." Plessy, and its acceptance
of

7

Strallder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

8

United States v. Carolel1e Prodllcts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).

9

Scott v. Sandford,
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163 U.S. 537 (1896).

19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
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state-sponsored
segregation,
remained the law for over half of the twentieth
century until the Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education in
1954.11
Nor was the Supreme Court's abdication of its responsibility
to protect
individual
rights limited to the area of race. Through most of our nation's
history, women - though not technically a minority - were locked out of the
political process because they were denied the right to vote. Women also faced
deliberating
stereotypes that kept them advancing outside the home. Take my
field - law - for example. Women were thought to be ill-qualified for adversarial
litigation because it required skills women were presumed not to possess - a
sharp mind and shrewd tactical abilities - and it involved being exposed to the
unjust and the immoral.
Perhaps the most famous case of discrimination
in the field of law involves Myra Bradwell of Chicago. In 1869, Bradwell, who had studied law
under her husband, applied to the Illinois bar and was refused admission. The
Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that, as a married woman, her contracts were
not binding, and contracts were the essence of an attorney-client
relationship.12 The Court also proclaimed that "God designed the sexes to occupy
different spheres of action" and that "it belonged to men to make, apply, and
execute the laws." One Justice cited the natural differences between men and
women as the reason Bradwell could not be admitted: "Man is, or should be,
women's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life."
A final example of a case in which this Court did not vigorously enforce
the rights of the politically powerless was Buck v. Bell.14 In that case, decided
in 1927, the Court reviewed a Virginia law that allowed the State to sterilize
the mentally retarded. The law was passed as part of the eugenics movement a movement that sought sterilization
and which reached its height in Nazi
Germany only a decade later. The law was challenged as violating due process
and equal protection under the 14th Amendment. In words that sound chilling
to the modern ear, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes - overall, of our Justices explained:
"We have seen more -than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for the lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence.
«S)ociety can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind ... Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
11

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

12
13
14

Bradwell's Case, 55 111,535 (1869).
Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 130 (1872).
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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Though we cannot deny that Dred Scott, Plessy, Bradwell, and Buck v.
Bell are a part of our constitutional tradition, today we do not follow these
decisions. Indeed, our constitutional history since Justice Stone's famous footnote in 1938 has been one about which we can be much more proud. Of
course, every American knows of the case I mentioned earlier - Brown v.
Board of Education. The 1954 decision held that a State's maintenance of
separate public schools for black and white elementary and secondary students
denied the black students the equal protection of state law assured by the 14th
Amendment. Brown called for an end of a system of segregation that had
become a way of life in a large part of the United States. That decision, and
those that followed from it, caused the Court, under the banner of equal protection and due process, to take a leading role in the issue of race relations in
the United States.
And just as Brown redeemed the Court's performance in the area of race,
a string of case beginning in the 1970s redeemed the Court's performance in
the area of gender, Beginning in the early 1970s, the Court struck down legislation that provided dissimilar treatment for similarly situated women and men.
The first case in which the Court found a state law discriminating against
women to be unconstitutional was Reed v. Reed.ls In Reed, the Court struck
down an Idaho law giving men an automatic preference in appointments as
administrators of estates. In subsequent cases, the Court made clear that it
would no longer accept unthinkingly the story that women are different from
men. In 1973, striking down a federal statute that made it easier for men to
claim their wives as dependents than it was for women to claim their husbands
as dependents, 16 Justice Breman wrote: "There can be no doubt that our Nation
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally,
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on an pedestal, but in a cage."
In subsequent years, the Court invalidated, on equal protection grounds
a broad range of statutes that discriminated on the basis of gender. In all the
three c~ses, the Court has looked with a somewhat jaundiced eye at the loosefitting generalization, myths, and archaic stereotypes that previously kept women
at home. Instead, the Court has often asked employees to look to whether the
particular person involved, male or female, is capable of doing the job, not
whether women in general are more or less capable than men.
Another group of modern cases that exemplify the Court's robust enforcement of individual rights are those in which outsider groups - including
women and minorities seek access to the political process. By political access,
I refer to such rights as the right to vote and the right to have one's vote count

15

404 U.S. 71 (1971).

16

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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the same as anybody else's, i.e., the right to a fairly apportioned legislature. In
this regard, I should note that the right to vote was secured for blacks through
the 15th Amendment, ratified in 1870, for women through the 19th Amendment, ratified in 1920, and for the poor through the 24th Amendment, ratified
in 1964 (although by 1964, poll taxes were rare). Better late than never, 1 say.
As for fairly apportioned legislatures, over several landmarks cases in the
early 1960s, the Supreme Court announced the principle of one-person, onevote. In practice, this meant that states could no longer favour rural voters,
who were mainly white, over urban voters, who were mainly black, in drawing
their legislative districts.
By political access, however, I also mean the right to political protest,
that is, the right to take one's struggle to the people and into the streets. While
many have focussed on this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education
as fostering the civil movements of the 1960s, and 1970s, the cases upholding
rights deserve to be remembered as well.
In the 1958 decision NAACP v. Albana,17 for example, the Supreme
Court, held that the State of Alaban could not force the National Association
for the Advancement of Coloured People - a leading civil rights organization
for blacks - to disclose its membership lists. The Court feared that forced
disclosure of membership lists threatened the free association rights of southem blacks, for if their membership in this controversial organization became
public, they might suffer retaliation at the hands of hostile white Southerners.
Similarly, in NAACP v. Button,18 the Court stuck down a Virginia laws that
would have made it almost impossible for the NAACP's lawyers to conduct the
desegregation litigation of the type they conducted in Brown.
And then, of course, there were the sit-in cases. By the early 1960s, the
sit-in movement was spreading rapidly throughout the South, as young blacks
targ,eted segregated lunch corners, swimming pool, libraries, movie theatres,
and any other place where blacks relegated to separate and unequal status.
Protesters also took their cause to capitals of the state governments and to
other institutions of state authority, demanding that the southern States provide
them equality under law. These protesters were generally carted off to jail as
soon as possible by local officials. In a series of cases in the 1960s, the Court
overturned the convictions of these protesters. In so doing, the Court made
clear that political protest by an unpopular minority was at the very heart of
our constitutional democracy. Describing one of the protests, the Court correctly concluded that it reflected an exercise of "basic constitutional rights in
their most pristine and classic form". Even if the protesters' speech angered
some, the Court said, it was protected because speech "may indeed best serve

17
18

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
371 U.S. 415 (1962).
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its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger". That political protest, speech is "provocative and challenging" and may "strike at prejudices and
preconceptions"
is reason to protect, not prohibit, it.19
What makes the political access cases, stand out so vividly in our constitutional history is that they are cases in which the very tensions to which I
alluded earlier - between the idea of majority rule and the idea of having
enforceable rights against the majority - find resolution. That is, they are cases
in which the Court may have acted contrary to the will of the majority, but in
so doing,furthered
democracy by ensuring that all groups - including outsiders
and minorities - have the right to speak and be heard on political issues.

III
To summarize

the Court's

role

in the United

States

as the ultimate

protector of constitutional
rights did not begin in earnest until after the recognition of the power of judicial review and until after the application of the Bill
of Rig~ts to the States. And even then, the Court took a long time
live up to its assigned role.

finally

to

But now that it has lived up to its role (more or less), some people over
the past 30 years or so have begun to wonder, in some instances, whether the
Court - and federal judges generally - have gone too far, whether, in the name
of protecting individual rights against one kind of tyranny - the tyranny of the
majority - federal judges have sometimes created another kind of tyranny: the
tyranny of unelected, unaccountable judges. These critics usually refer to this
phenomenon
as "judicial activism". I thought you might find it interesting for
me to offer few comments on "judicial activism" in light of the fact that "judicial activism" is an issue I know India is struggling with as well.
First things first. The most important fact to understand about "judicial
activism" is that people use the label in many different ways - though, of
course, almost always as a criticism. Indeed, one American commentator
has
counted ten different ways the label is used. Let me focus here on what I
consider to be three of the more common ways.
Some people use the label "judicial activism" simply as a criticism of
any decision in which a judge strikes down a democratically
enacted law they
strongly support on policy grounds. So, for example, I am sure there were
people who called the Strauder decision "activist" (or the nineteenth century
equivalent),
and they did so even though it is indisputable that the text of the
constitution
compelled the result. People certainly called the Brown decision

19

Edwards v. South Carolelle, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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"act.ivist" regardless of whether they could reconcile the notion of equal protection under the law with the idea of forbidding black schoolchildren
from
attending white public schools.
Used this way, then, the charge of "judicial activism" is really nothing
more than a criticism of the long-established
power of judicial review, and to
that extent may be largely dismissed. Indeed, I consider it a badge of honour
that the Court has had the courage to enforce violations of individual rights
where the Constitution
plainly requires it. It is the job of the judges to decide
cases according to the law, not their own policy preference,
and the Bill of
Rights is just as much a part of our nation's law as any other part. Some
decisions may not be popular, as the Brown decision surely was not to segregationists. The newsreel footage of national Guard soldiers having to be called
out to enforce the decision is still vivid in may mind. But, be that as it may,
the requirements
of the Constitution,
and not popularity, are the measure of a
judge's decision.
Criticism of the institution of Judicial review is a healthy thing, however, because it serves constantly to remind us what an awesome power judicial review is and therefore with what a tremendous sense of responsibility,
seriousness and humility it should be exercised. The fact is: legislative bodies
are more representative
of the people and are more directly controlled by the
people than are the courts. It makes sense that these bodies should bave principal ,responsibility
for determining the fate of the people. The Courts, by contrast, are decidedly unrepresentative
and undemocratic.
The Justices of the
Supreme Court, like all federal judges, are not elected at all, but are instead
appointed by the President. We serve not just for two years, as do the members
of the United States House of Representatives;
or for four years, as does the
President; or for six years, as do the members of the Senate (the other half of
our bicameral legislature). We serve for life. And the Supreme Court does not
reflect the American population. All but one of the current Justices are older
than 50 years of age, yet only 30% of Americans of voting age have lived five
decades. All of the current Justices - indeed, all of the 108 Justices who have
ever sat on the Court - are lawyers. Despite the impressions that you may have
of the United S tates, not all Americans are lawyers - indeed, only one in 418
was a lawyer as of 1980. And women in America constitute over half of the
general population and approximately
a third of the new lawyers. Women on
the Supreme Court, in contrast, are - well, half of us are right in front of you
today.
In light of this, the prospect of invalidating
a democratically
enacted
law should always weigh heavily on a judges's mind. For me, one way (among
several) that I try to give effect to this sentiment is to take seriously the timehonoured principle that statutes should be construed, where possible, to avoid
serious constitutional
issues. Let me give you one example. The Supreme Court
had a case a few years back that dealt with a health department policy that
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prohibited federally-funded
family planning clinics from discussing the option
of abortion with their patients.2o Some felt that the policy infringed on a woman's
right to control her reproductive life as well as on the free speech rights of the
doctors and nurses in the planning clinics; others said that it did not infringe
on such rights - and ultimately, the latter side prevailed. My view, however,
was that there was no need to address the constitutionality
of the health department policy. This was because it was by no means clear, from the text of
the statute that inauthorizing
the health department to make family-planning
policies, the Congress would have allowed the policy at issue; and given this,
I thought it made the most sense to assume that Congress did not mean to
allow such a policy and thus to invalidate it on that narrow, non-constitutional
ground. If this assumption about Congress' intentions were wrong, of course,
Congress would be free to clarify the governing statute. If not, that would he
the end of the mater. In concluding my separate opinion, I wrote, "This Court
acts at the limits of its power when it invalidates
a law on constitutional
grounds. In recognition of our place in the constitutional
scheme, we must act
with 'g~eat gravity and delicacy' when telling a coordinate branch that its actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional ameIlllment." This is merely
one example, but I hope a helpful one, of the seriousness with which I take the
exercise of the power of judicial review.
The second way I find that people commonly use the "judicial activism"
label is to criticize cases where they agree that there has been a constitutional
violation, but where they think the Court's remedy for that violation has gone
too far. Paradigm examples are those cases in which federal judges have ordered the busing of black children (who live in black neighbourhoods)
or
white schools (located in white neighbourhoods).
Few doubted that it was a
violation of equal protection for States to maintain legally segregated school
districts;
that was the holding of Brown. But many called it "activist"
for
courts, in fashioning a remedy for that violation, to go beyond simply ordering
the State to discontinue
legal segregation - a remedy which, because of preexisting residential segregation, would plainly not result in integrated schools
- and to require that States take sufficient, affirmative action such as busing to
begin to achieve integration. The argument for the former remedy is obvious:
if the states' constitutional
violation was to bar black schoolchildren
from
white schools, the constitutional
remedy should be to remove the bar - nothing
more, nothing less. The argument for a more affirmative remedy is less obvious; the argument is that the pattern of residential segregation
that makes a
simple "remove the bar" remedy ineffective as a means of integration was itself
caused; at lest in part, by the violation, that is, by years and years of statesponsored school segregation.
There's not much more J want to say on tbis
variant of the "judicial activism" charge, except to make an empirical point.
Regardless of where one strands on the ultimate legal issue of what remedies
the Con.stitution requires in situations such as school desegregation,
the practical reanty is that extraordinary
remedies such as busing have tended not to
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work very well. 40 years after Brown, for example, our schools remain as
segregated
as they ever have been - even in places where busing has been
court-ordered
for a long time. Nor should this be surprising, given that extraordinary remedies require the kind of constant oversight judges cannot provide,
the kind of expertise judges do not have, and the kind of resources judges do
not control. Certainly this point would not have been lost on the Framers'
generation,
who understood
Hamilton wrote:

the practical

limits of judicial

power.

Alexander

The executive not only dispense the honours but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the pure but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of citizen are to
be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or
of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will but
merely judgement arm even for the efficacy of its judgements.21
If the first variant on the "judicial activism" criticism pertains to the
results of court decisions and the second pertains to remedies, the third variant
I want to discuss, and probably the most important variant, pertains to reasoning of decisions.
In short, (unelected) judges, everyone agrees, derive their
legitimacy from the fact that they interpret laws that others make, which includes the Constitution and the Bill of Rights; judges are not supposed to make
law themselves. Thus, people call "activist" any decision in which they feel a
judge, in justifying the decision, went beyond the text of the Constitution
and
this made law.
One problem with this criticism, I should point out at the start, is that
some modest degree of "constitutional
lawmaking" is inevitable.
The United
States Constitution,
like India's Constitution,
is one that speaks in general
terms. In particular,
the Bill of Rights uses terms like "freedom of speech",
"unreasonable
searches and seizures", and "cruel and unusual punishment".
The
Framers of the Constitution
did not write the document to address only the
problems of their own generation, they wrote a charter of government that was
designed to endure. Under Marbury, American judges are charged with the
duty of giving life to these guarantees in the very different world of toady.
Former federal judge and constitutional
scholar Robert Bork captured this aspect of constitutional
lawmaking in a First Amendment case when he wrote:
Judges given stewardship of a constitutional
provisions - such as
the First Amendment - whose core is known, but whose outer reach

20

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

21

The Federalist Papers No. 78.
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and contours are ill-defined,
face the never-ending
task of discerning the meaning of the provision from ones case to the next.
(1)t is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how the
framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know .... The fourth amendment
(for example) was framed by men who did not foresee electronic surveillance. But that does not make it wrong for judges to apply central
command of that amendment to electronic invasions of personal
privacy.22
The Supreme Court engages in this form of "constitutional
lawmaking"
in almost every constitutional
case before it. The First Amendment states that
"Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press". The Amendment tells us that the Framers viewed vigorous debate and a
press largely unfettered by government regulation as a value central to a healthy
democracy.
It does not tell us what rules should govern potential crippling
libel suits against the press, but in cases like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'23
the Supreme Court fashioned particular legal rules to protect the freedom of
the press to report on controversial
current affairs free form the shadow of
massive damage liability. The Framers identified the important value in the
Constitution
itself, but the Court must enforce it in the face of new threats. By
the way, I should add that this common form of judicial lawmaking is not
really unique to constitutional
interpretation;
judges must do the same kind of
thing when thy interpret general provisions in statutes; the difference, of courses,
is that, with statutes, if the judge interprets the general provision in ways the
legislature disapproves,
the legislature can always amend the statute.
The second and more controversial
form of "constitutional
lawmaking"
is in the area of what we call enumerated or unwritten rights. In the broad
guarantees against deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law", contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
the
Supreme Court has identified certain fundamental liberties which are not mentioned in the text of the Bill of Rights itself. Thus, under what some have
called the doctrine of "substantive"
due process, the Court has held that the
right to marry, decisions concerning whether or not to beget a child, and certain parental decisions concerning
the rearing and education of children in
their regulation.
The second Justice Harlan offered this explanation
on "substantive" due process:
Due process has not been rendered to any formula; its content
cannot be determined
by reference to any particular
code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this Country's

22
23

'Oilmall v. Evalle, 750 F. 2nd 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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decisions it has represented
the balance which our nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organised. society ... The balance has been struck by this country, having regard
to what history teaches area the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.24
Critics of "substantive"
due process, and of unenumerated
rights generally, rightly recall that the same doctrine (though not called by the same name)
formed the basis of an entire line of decisions - epitomized by the 1905 Lochner
decision25 - in which the Court invalidated Progressive-Era
legislation, such as
maximum hour and minimum age laws. The logic of these decisions was that
the Constitution
contains an unenumerated
"right to contract" and that that
right was violated by legislation that mandated maximum work hours, minimum wages, and the like. The critics' larger point is that once a judge strays
from the unenumerated
rights mentioned in the Constitution,
she cannot help
but decide cases on the basis of her personal preference as to what rights
should be protected - and while sometimes we may agree with these preferences, sometimes we may not as the Lochner line of cases tend to show.
Again, there is not much 1 can say, or should say, about where 1 stand
on this debate over unenumerated
rights - a debate which remains fierce except to repeat my point that judges should, and must, undertake judicial
review with great sense of caution and seriousness.
And this is particularly
true where the subject is unenumerated rights.
But there are a three quick observations of another kind that 1 do want
to make. First, those who criticise our federal judges or courts as being "judicial activists" because of their recognition of unenumerated
rights tend to forget that these cases are few and far between, and do not in any way constitute
a significant portion of our jurisprudence.
The bread and butter of our work, of
course, is resolving cases that involve interpreting statutes or the express provisions of the Constitution
(like the 4th Amendment' bar on unreasonable
searches and seizures).
Second, some small cluster of unenumerated rights have become, in
deeply in our constitutional
landscape, and so the doctrine of stare decisis
doctrine that courts ought not overturn their own precedent without very
pelling reasons to do so - must be brought to bear in any discussion on
legal merits. One traditional element of judicial restraint, after all, is a
respect for decisions of the past.
Third,
24
25
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Constitution
sought to avoid the thicket of "substantive" due process - and this
of a main source of unenumerated
rights - by specifying, in their due process
case, that "due process" is a "procedural" concept only. Apparently,
this particular clarification
may have been the result of advice that one of our great
Justices, Felix Frankfurter, gave to those drafting the Indian Constitution.
This
would make sense, of course, because Justice Frankfurter
was well-known
having been advocate of the kind of worker legislation that the Lochner Court
struck down - for his suspicion of the doctrine of "substantive"
due process
and of judicial review generally. Not surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter, the story
goes, also recommended
that India not make any of its constitutional
rights
judicially
enforceable.
In any event, although India may have avoided the
constitutional
thicket of "substantive" due process, it certainly has encountered
thickets of other kinds. The furious dehate in your country, for example, over
high court cases holding that the legislature may not amend the Constitution
in
ways that affect it "basic structure" is one that our country has not had to face.
Perhaps it is simply the star-crossed fate of all genuine constitutional
democracies, like India and like the United States, to live with the endlessly contested question of what is "judicial activism" and what do we do to minimize

it.
IV

Let me conclude. The unfortunate fact is that, like the rest of the world,
the United States, like India, continues to be plagued by poverty, inequality,
and discrimination
against minority groups. The ultimate responsibility
for
resolving these and other problems lies with the people, and with their democratically
elected legislative and executive leaders. This is the challenge
to
both governments.
In a genuine constitutional
democracy"
however, courts do have a special role to play. Based on a good faith belief of what the Constitution
requires, courts can - and must - act in individual cases to protect
individual
rights. And is so doing, they not only vindicate
the interests of the parties
before them, but send an important signal about the values underlying our law.
Brown is a great example of this, because although the case may not have
altered the degree of segregation that exists in our nation's school, it contributed significantly
to the sea-charge of attitudes towards racial equality that
began in our country in the 1950s and 1960s. But in protecting constitutional
rights, judges must always remain cognizant of the indispensable,
yet carefully
circumscribed
role they play ion a constitutional
democracy. It is a difficult
role to play, to be sure: to have the courage to be the ultimate protector of
individual rights but also to have the humility to stay mindful that I am just
one minor player in an essentially democratic system. To be, at once, courageous and humble - this is the challenge to both our judiciaries.

